Prelude
(Drawings will be added at a later date)
(Topical anchors will be added at a later date)
On April 15, 1861, Lincoln issued his call for 75,000 volunteers, and soon troops were pouring into Washington. On May 23, Virginia voted to ratify the Ordinance of Secession, and the next day columns of Federal troops crossed the Potomac and seized Alexandria and Arlington Heights. Eight days later Richmond became the capital of the Confederacy and the chief objective of the Federal armies in the East. Stretching from the Ohio River to the Chesapeake Bay, Virginia constituted the wealthiest and most populous state of the Confederacy. Here were to be found rich natural resources and a heavy network of railroads and highways for military transport. These military advantages, however, were somewhat offset by the deep waters which flanked much of the state, increasing its vulnerability to Federal attack.
Straight across the path of one of the main roads to Richmond lay Manassas, a small railroad settlement, only a few miles east of the Bull Run Mountains. Here the Orange and Alexandria Railroad formed a Junction with the Manassas Gap line which extended westward through the Blue Ridge to Strasburg, near Winchester. By seizure of this significant junction, located approximately 25 miles southwest of Washington, the Federal army could follow the Orange and Alexandria southwest to Gordonsville and thence proceed by the Virginia Central eastward to Richmond. This, with good supporting highways, would assure an overland approach that would avoid many of the natural barriers found in the shortest route by Aquia Creek and Fredericksburg, Virginia.
The significance of Manassas was likewise apparent to the Confederates. As early as May 6, 1861, Colonel St. George Cocke, commanding the Potomac Department, had received a dispatch from General Robert E. Lee: "You are desired to post at Manassas Gap junction a force sufficient to defend that point against an attack likely to be made against it by troops from Washington."
The first troops to arrive were two raw, undrilled, and ununiformed Irish regiments from Alexandria, armed with altered muskets. By May 14, Cocke was able to write Lee that he had succeeded in assembling a force of 918 men at Manassas. That he had a clear grasp of the military significance of the area is seen in his dispatch to Lee the next day: "It is obvious, sir, with a strong corps d'armee at Manassas, and at least a division at Winchester, these two bodies being connected by a continuous railway through Manassas Gap, there should be kept at all times upon that road ample means of transportation. These two columns--one at Manassas and one at Winchester--could readily co-operate and concentrate upon the one point or the other." Here then was a significant germ of Confederate strategy.
As a phase of this strategy, Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston had been sent to take command of the Confederate force of about 12,000 men stationed in the northern end of the Shenandoah Valley at Harper's Ferry. Here was the gateway to the North through the Cumberland Valley of Maryland and here passed the great Baltimore and Ohio Railroad which connected Washington with the West. But Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott, then in command of the Army of the United States, had dispatched Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson with a force of about 18,000 men to seize this strategic position and to prevent, at all odds, the junction of Johnston's forces with the Confederate army at Manassas.
Confederates Look to Manassas Defenses
On June 1, Brig. Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard, the Confederate hero of Fort Sumter, arrived to take command at Manassas. Two days later he was writing President Jefferson Davis requesting reinforcements. At this early date the defenses of Manassas appeared anything but formidable to the eyes of an English lieutenant of artillery who, arriving at night, viewed them for the first time: "I could scarcely believe that this was a great military depot, there being nothing within my range of vision to indicate that such was the fact. The station itself was a low, one-story building, about seventy-five feet in length, with bales and boxes scattered about; a house of refreshment close by was uninviting, and except one or two small cottages scattered here and there, naught was to be seen."By the end of June this picture had materially changed. The roads, the fields, and the town were filled with soldiers by the thousands. Around the Junction massive fortifications had been erected running out in different directions from the station. Through the embrasures of these earthworks the muzzles of heavy cannon pointed menacingly toward Washington. Acres of trees had been felled to give free range to artillery, and at key positions along the front men were constantly on guard at their battle stations. Camps had sprung up like mushrooms in the open countryside, and here, troops in and out of uniform could be seen almost incessantly engaged in drill.
By June 23, Beauregard was able to advise the Confederate Secretary of War that, in consequence of large reinforcements lately received, he had been able to divide his forces into six brigades commanded by Bonham, Ewell, D. R. Jones, Terrett, Cocke, and Early. Advance detachmcnts had been stationed at key points including Centreville, Fairfax Court House, Germantown, the junction of the Old Braddock Road with the Fairfax Court House Road, and at Sangster's Crossroads. With the main body of his troops partially intrenched along Bull Run, from Union Mills to the Stone Bridge, Beauregard watched closely the Federal preparations for an advance.
As the tension mounted, alarms occurred with increasing frequency. Bootless, hatless, and coatless men often dashed to assembly sounded by the "thump, thump of the big drums." Rumors of the Federal advance "filled every breeze." In a dispatch, dated July 9, Beauregard informed President Davis: "Enemy's force increasing, and advancing daily this side of Potomac. He will soon attack with very superior numbers. No time should be lost in re-enforcing me here with at least ten thousand men--volunteers or militia."
On the 17th Beauregard telegraphed President Davis informing him of an attack on his outposts and requesting that he send reinforcements "at the earliest possible moment." Confronted with this crisis, Davis acted quickly. Advising Beauregard of the dispatch of reinforcements of Hampton's Legion, McRae's regiment, and two battalions of Mississippi and Alabama troops, he ordered Holmes' troops up from Fredericksburg. The same day, through his adjutant, he sent the following dispatch to Johnston in Winchester:
RICHMOND, July 17,1861.General J. E. JOHNSTON, WINCHESTER, Va.:
General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive blow a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If practicable, make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to Culpeper Court House either by railroad or by Warrenton. In all the arrangements exercise your discretion.
S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General.
Realizing that Harper's Ferry was untenable, Johnston had previously retired upon Winchester, with Patterson in cautious pursuit. Receiving Davis' dispatch at 1 a. m., July 18, Johnston determined to elude Patterson and join Beauregard as quickly as possible. By a forced march he reached Piedmont where his various brigades entrained for Manassas Junction, 35 miles away. Brig. Gen. Thomas J. [Stonewall] Jackson's brigade was in advance, followed by those of Bee, Bartow, and Elzey.
Thus, after approximately 3 months of hurried preparation following Fort Sumter, the stage was finally set-the drama of the opening battle was about to unfold.
The Federal Army Moves Toward Manassas
On July 16, Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell had reluctantly put the Federal army in motion. In vain he had attempted to delay the movement until adequate training could provide him with an effective fighting force composed of the 3-year volunteers, authorized by President Lincoln on May 3, but popular clamor would not be denied. Pressure for a forward movement was heightened by the realization that the term of enlistment was rapidly expiring for a large body of the troops. Further delay would mean the loss of their services.With excitement and high expectancy, the army, accompanied by many notables in fine carriages, took to the road 35,000 strong. Seldom had the country seen such a splash of color as was presented by the brilliant uniforms of the various regiments and the gaily fluttering national and regimental flags. The first day's advance covered only 6 miles. Oppressive heat, dust, thirst, and the weight of heavy equipment slowed the step and caused considerable straggling.
Lagging spirits, however, caught fire with the triumphant advance of Hunter's division into Fairfax Court House. As the head of the column swung into town, Confederate units stationed there fled in such haste as to leave large quantities of forage and camp equipage behind. In an impressive show of martial splendor, the troops, four abreast with fixed bayonets, paraded through the streets to the stirring strains of the national anthem and other patriotic airs struck up by the regimental bands.
From Fairfax Court House the advance moved cautiously toward Centreville, with engineers and axmen flung forward to alert the army to "masked batteries" and to clear roadblocks of fallen timber left by the retiring Confederates. By noon of the 18th the main body of McDowell's army had assembled at Centreville and now stood poised to strike.
During the advance, little or no information had been received regarding Patterson's movements in the valley. Irked by this, Scott telegraphed Patterson as follows:
Washington, July 18,1861.Major-General Patterson, . . .
I have certainly been expecting you to beat the enemy. If not, to hear that you had felt him strongly, or, at least, had occupied him by threats and demonstrations. You have been at least his equal, and, I suppose, superior, in numbers. Has he not stolen a march and sent reenforcements toward Manassas junction? A week is enough to win victories. . . .
WINFIELD SCOTT
To this, Patterson sent the following reply to Colonel Townsend in Scotts' headquarters:
CHARLESTOWN, VA., July 18th, 1861Col. E. D. Townsend:
Telegram of to-day received. The enemy has stolen no march upon me. I have kept him actively employed, and by threats and reconnaissances in force caused him to be re-enforced. I have accomplished in this respect more than the General-in-Chief asked, or could well be expected, in face of an enemy far superior in numbers, with no line of communication to protect. . . .
R. PATTERSON,
The events of the next few days more than justified Scott's suspicions.
McDowell Tests the Confederate Right
On July 18, in a feeling movement on the Confederate right, Tyler made a thrust against Beauregard's troops stationed in the vicinity of Blackburn's Ford. The affair got somewhat out of hand with the result that the Federal force was smartly repulsed. The action had a depressing effect on Union morale but greatly boosted that of the Confederates. There then followed 2 days of costly delay for McDowell during which time he brought forward his supplies--a delay the Confederates were quick to capitalize upon. To the sound of the axe and the crash of falling trees, they built roadblocks along the Warrenton Pike in the vicinity of the Stone Bridge and in general strengthened their defenses. More important, the delay gave Johnston much needed time in which to reach Manassas.Confederate reinforcements were now steadily moving in. On the 19th, Jackson arrived 2,500 strong, having covered approximately 55 miles in 25 hours. At sunrise of the 20th, more of Johnston's reinforcements had come in--the 7th and 8th Georgia regiments of Bartow's brigade numbering 1,400 men. About noon, Johnston himself arrived accompanied by Bee, the 4th Alabama, the 2d Mississippi, and two companies of the 11th Mississippi. The Confederate camp now became a scene of busy activity. While the reinforcements moved up to position in the line, Beauregard and Johnston conferred on plans for an offensive. Candles burned low in headquarters that night as Beauregard and his staff put the finishing touches to the Confederate plan of attack. At 4:30 a. m., he submitted it to Johnston, his superior, for the approval that was quickly granted. The plan involved the flanking of the Federal left, but the early movement of McDowell, the delayed arrival of expected reinforcements, and the miscarriage of orders combined to prevent its execution.
(Text Adapted From: Manassas Historical Handbook Series - publication of the National Park Service. 1961.)