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Kennesaw Mountain
Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield ParkKennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park is administered by the National Park Service of the United States Department of the Interior. The mailing address is 900 Kennesaw Mountain Drive, Kennesaw, GA 30152. Telephone: 770-427-4686.
Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park, documenting the battle for Kennesaw Mountain, is one component of the Atlanta Campaign in the Civil War. The Park is located circa 20 miles north of Atlanta, Georgia (three miles north of Marietta, GA): from Atlanta, take U.S. Highway I-75 north 20 miles to exit 116. Drive approximately one mile northwest on U. S. Highway 41 to intersection with Old U. S. Highway 41. Drive approximately two miles northwest on Old U. S. Highway 41 to intersection with Stilesboro Road. Turn left on Stilesboro Road and drive 1/4 mile west to Park entrance .
Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park, although located on the site of the Kennesaw Mountain battlefield, provides visitors with information about the entire Atlanta Campaign during the Civil War.
The Park grounds are open daily from 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m., extended to 6 p.m. on weekdays during the summer. The Park is closed on Christmas and New Year's Day. The National Park Service maintains a Visitor's Center on the Park grounds, containing exhibits and audiovisual programs.
On the Park grounds is a self-guided driving tour. Interpretive markers and wayside exhibits are situated along the driving trail, each with parking provided. Short interpretive trails are located on the mountaintop, with exhibits and gun emplacements, and stops providing panoramic views of the battlefield terrain. Longer hiking trails also crisscross the Park.
Civil War Sites Advisory Commission Report on Kennesaw Mountain: GA015
(The CWSAC Battle Summary Will Open In Its Own Window)
Kennesaw Mountain In The Atlanta Campaign: June 27, 1864
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KENNESAW MOUNTAIN
Several days after the battle at Kolb's farm, Sherman decided on a change in tactics--he would make a direct assault on Johnston's lines. It was a bold decision that offered the possibility of a great victory. The Southern line was thinly held and a successful attack could lead to the isolation and destruction of a large part of Johnston's army. The Federal commander decided to strike the Confederates at three points: McPherson would assault the southern end of Kennesaw Mountain, Thomas would move against a salient known as the "Dead Angle" (on what is now called Cheatham's Hill) several miles to the south, and Schofield would push south on Sandtown Road and attempt to cross Olley's Creek. June 27 was set as the date for the assault, but Schofield was to begin demonstrations on the 26th to draw Southerners away from other portions of the line.Early on the 27th, the Federals began to probe at various points along the Confederate trenches to distract the defenders. At 8 a.m. the Northern artillery opened a brief but heavy fire to prepare the way for the assaults. A few minutes later, the Federal infantry moved forward. McPherson's troops, advancing on both sides of Burnt Hickory Road, swept over the Southern outposts and moved rapidly across the broken ground toward the main Confederate trenches. Although their lines were disordered, the blue-clad soldiers scrambled over rocks and fallen trees until they were finally halted by the heavy fire from their entrenched enemies. A few reached the Confederate line and were killed or captured while fighting in their opponents' works. Southerners on Little Kennesaw added to the Northerners' discomfort by rolling huge rocks down the mountainside at them. When the Union troops realized that their attack could not reach the Confederate lines, they broke off the engagement. Some were able to find protection in the advanced Confederate rifle-pits they had overrun and some managed to reach the positions from which they had begun the assault. A few were forced to seek shelter among the trees and large rocks on the slopes of the mountain where they remained until darkness offered a chance to return to their own lines.
To the south, Thomas fared no better. Two columns were directed against the Southern position--one at Cheatham's Hill, the other a short distance to the north. The Southerners expected no attack. Many of them were off duty and others were relaxing in the lines. The Federal artillery, however, alerted them to the danger and when Thomas' infantry started forward, the Confederates were ready.
As soon as the dense blue columns appeared in the cleared area between the lines, the Confederates opened what one Northerner called a "terrible" fire upon them. Men dropped rapidly but the columns continued up the long slope toward the Southern position. "The air," one Federal remembered, "seemed filled with bullets, giving one the sensation experienced when moving swiftly against a heavy rain or sleet storm." As the Union soldiers neared the crest of the ridge, they met the full fury of the defenders' fire. To one Federal it seemed as if the Confederate trenches were "veritable volcanoes...vomiting forth fire and smoke and raining leaden hail in the face of the Union boys."
Most of the attackers never reached the Confederate line. Those who did were too few to overpower the defenders and were quickly killed or captured. For a few brief seconds, two Northern battle flags waved on the breastworks, but the bearers were soon shot down and within a short time the attack had failed.
As Thomas' left assaulting column struck that portion of the Southern line held by the consolidated lst and 15th Arkansas Regiments, the gunfire ignited the underbrush and many wounded Federals faced the terrifying prospect of being burned to death. In one of the notable acts of the war, Lt. Col. William H. Martin, commanding the Arkansans, jumped from his trenches waving a white handkerchief and shouting to the Northerners to come and get the wounded men. For a few minutes, fighting was suspended along that short stretch of the line and some of Martin's soldiers went to assist in moving their helpless enemies away from the flames. When the wounded had been removed to safety, the two sides resumed hostilities, but here too it was clear that the attack would not be able to break Johnston's lines.
At the Dead Angle, some of the attacking Northerners remained under the crest of the ridge within a few yards of the Confederate trenches. There they dug rifle pits of their own and started to burrow under the hill, hoping to fill the tunnel with gunpowder and blow up the salient. However, before this project had progressed very far, the Southerners abandoned the position and thus rendered the subterranean attack unnecessary.
While the attacks of McPherson and Thomas were being repulsed, Schofield was gaining a clear success at the extreme right of the Union line. On the 26th, one of his brigades crossed Olley's Creek north of Sandtown Road and, on the following day, cleared their opponents from the area, securing a position several miles to the south which placed the right of their line closer to the Chattahoochee than was the left of Johnston's army. From this position the Northerners could strike at the Confederate line of supply and perhaps cut Johnston off from all sources of help by breaking the railroad.
Exact casualty figures for the battles of June 27 are not available. However, the best estimates place Northern losses at about 3,000 men. The Southerners lost at least 750 killed, wounded, or captured.
Sherman has been criticized for ordering the frontal attack on Johnston's lines, but it now seems that his decision was not unwise. Had the assault succeeded, he would have won a great victory. As it was, he did not continue the attacks when it was clear that they would fail, and he had managed to secure a position from which he could easily pry Johnston out of the Kennesaw line.
(Text Adapted From: Atlanta Campaign Historical Handbook Series - publication of the National Park Service. 1961.)
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revised: September 28, 2009
created: August 7, 2001
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